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THE GEORGE A. LEET BusINEss
LAW SYMPOSIUM:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
DIRECTORS VS. SHAREHOLDERS?
INTRODUCTION
The history of the corporate governance debate began with the
publication of The Modem Corporation and Private Property' in
1932. It announced to a surprised public the notion of separation of
ownership and control; that is, the idea that the shareholders who, in a
general sense, own the corporation do not actually control it. In economic theory, the directors are the agents, and the executives mere
subagents, of the shareholders. In fact, however, the executives, the
managers, and the officers are the ones who really run the business
and often do so to some extent for their own benefit rather than for
the benefit of the shareholders.
Enthusiasm for reform since then has waxed and waned. Not surprisingly in the 1990s, with the stock market soaring and everybody
making money, nobody pushed for fundamental changes in corporate
governance. Then at the turn of the millennium we were hit by a
number of corporate scandals-Enron, Tyco, et cetera.
One disturbing aspect of those scandals was the absence of the
boards of directors. Also disturbing was that by their composition
and practices, these boards did not seem to be defective. In many
respects they seemed to be at least average, if not above average
boards of directors, yet they did not detect the scandals brewing
within their own companies.
Now the tide has shifted; there is a lot of agitation for reform. We
have seen a number of changes as a result of that enthusiasm, the
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most notable being the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 and changes to
the listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ. We also see some initiatives in the Securities and Ex-3
change Commission, most notably the proposal for Rule 14a-l 1,
which would enhance the role of shareholders in the nomination and
election of directors. This symposium, therefore, occurs at an opportune time to discuss corporate governance.
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